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In November 1991, federal lawmakers threatened to place a binding cap on credit card
interest rates. I find that credit card rates declined following the regulatory threat, more
so for larger and more politically visible credit card issuers. A set of stock market event
studies reveals that interest rate cuts announced after the threat led to positive abnormal
returns, both for announcing issuers and their rivals. This pattern does not exist for
similar rate cuts made outside the period of regulatory threat. The results suggest that
firms may experience private benefits to price-cutting when doing so mitigates regulatory
threat, and spillover benefits when another firm cuts prices in order to ease regulatory
threat.
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I. Introduction
In November 1991, President Bush and members of Congress threatened to place a
binding cap on credit card interest rates unless they saw significant rate cuts by major
credit card issuers.  In this paper, I document the events surrounding this episode of
regulatory threat, focusing both on the threat itself and subsequent rate-cutting by credit
card issuers.  I examine both the price and stock market effects of these events, in order to
assess the empirical relevance of models in which firms may react strategically to
regulatory threat.
The broad issue at hand is an investigation of the relationship between firm
conduct and the threat of government regulation.  Most economic models of firm conduct
assume away the influence of regulatory threat, or assume that it is exogenous.  This is
too restrictive if we think that regulatory threat might constrain prices, particularly when
there is a direct link between prices and the probability of regulation.1
Because quantifying the level of threat is so difficult, most empirical tests of the
regulatory threat hypothesis exploit cross-sectional differences in exposure to or influence
on regulatory threat.  During an episode of threat, these differences should be correlated
with movements in prices.  For example, Erfle and McMillan [1990] posit that large
domestic firms have more impact on the probability of regulation than smaller or foreign
firms, and find that domestic firms restrained prices more during the 1979 oil crisis
(during which, they argue, there was regulatory threat).  They also examine two different
                                        
1   Theoretical work by Glazer and McMillan [1992] and Erfle and McMillan [1990] formalizes the
intuitive proposition that when regulators tie the probability of regulation to prices, firms will constrain their
prices to mitigate regulatory threat.  This line of work derives broadly from the political economy literature
by Becker [1983], Stigler [1971], and Peltzman [1973], among others.2
types of oil, one of which was more "visible" than the other to American consumers, and
find that producers restrained price increases to a larger degree on the more visible type.
More recently, Ellison and Wolfram [2000] examine pharmaceutical prices during
an episode of regulatory threat.  Ellison and Wolfram also use cross-sectional patterns to
test the regulatory threat hypothesis, but they focus on differences in the cost of
regulation, were it to be imposed.  They suggest that firms with longer-lived patents are
more vulnerable to the imposition of regulation because they would lose monopoly rents.
The results show that these firms indeed constrained their prices more than those with
little patent protection during public discussion of health care reform (which proposed
regulation of pharmaceutical prices) in the early 1990s.  They also find that firms with
high recent PAC contributions constrained their prices more.  Maxwell, Lyon, and
Hackett [1999] take a similar approach in examining environmental “self-regulation,”
showing that firms in states with higher membership in conservation groups exhibit
higher levels of self-regulation.  Other more anecdotal evidence in support of the
regulatory threat hypothesis can be found in Glazer and McMillan [1992] and Olmstead
and Rhode [1985].
In a series of tests that evoke the work discussed above, I conduct in the first part
of this paper an examination of credit card prices.  An event study of national average
credit card interest rates shows that rates fell significantly following the threat.  The
cross-sectional pattern of rate changes during this period is also consistent with the
regulatory threat hypothesis: larger, more politically visible issuers cut their rates by more
than smaller issuers. However, because there are other plausible explanations for falling
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credit card rates during the 1990s, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion regarding the
precise impact of regulatory threat on rates.
The main body of the paper extends the literature on regulatory threat by using
stock market event studies to examine both the threat itself and subsequent rate-cutting
announcements by the largest credit card issuers.2  Observing stock market effects allows
me to test a wider set of implications of models of regulatory threat.  To conduct the
analysis, I construct a portfolio of the largest (and most politically visible) credit card
issuers.
I test first the straightforward prediction that regulatory threat should lead to
negative cumulative abnormal returns.  Previous studies of regulatory threat have been
unable to identify this effect, primarily because the incidence of regulatory threat has
rarely been so discrete.  The results of the event study show that over a ten-day event
window, the Bush/Senate regulatory threat led to a cumulative negative return of over ten
percent for the portfolio of credit card issuers.
A second prediction of the regulatory threat model is that for politically visible
issuers, price changes should affect firm value by changing the probability of regulation.
To test this prediction, I use newspaper accounts of legislative activity and card issuer
behavior to identify the period during which lawmakers tied the probability of regulation
to the level of credit card interest rates.  I then construct a list of rate cuts announced
during the threat period by the set of politically visible credit card issuers.  Because rate
cuts also affect returns in ways unrelated to regulatory threat, I construct a control group
of announcements for the ten-year period surrounding the episode of threat.  This permits4
a comparison of the effects of rate-cutting announcements during the episode of the threat
to the effects of rate-cutting announcements when regulatory threat was weak or
nonexistent.  Under the regulatory threat hypothesis, rate-cutting announcements should
be associated with more positive returns during episodes of regulatory threat.
The results confirm the regulatory threat hypothesis. In the absence of threat,
firms announcing rate cuts experience only small positive abnormal returns.  During the
period of regulatory threat, however, firms announcing rate cuts experience large positive
abnormal returns.  This suggests that there are private benefits to rate-cutting under
regulatory threat.
The final empirical test examines the spillover effects that price-cutting may have
in a multi-firm setting when a price change by any one firm affects the probability of
regulation faced by all firms.  In such a setting, a price cut by one firm may yield positive
returns for all firms because it reduces the probability of regulation.  To test this
prediction, I examine the returns of the announcing issuers’ rivals under the two regimes.
During the control period, rivals experienced weakly negative abnormal returns following
rate-cutting announcements.  During the episode of regulatory threat, rivals experienced
large, statistically significant, and positive abnormal returns following rate-cutting
announcements by their competitors.  The results confirm the existence of spillover
effects.
As corroborative evidence, I regress the issuer-level abnormal returns following
rate-cutting announcements on a set of event- and issuer-specific explanatory variables.
These results are also consistent with the regulatory threat hypothesis.  Absent threat,
                                                                                                                        
2   Event studies have been used extensively to analyze actual regulation.  Rose [1985] and Prager [1989]5
larger and more widely applicable rate cuts lead to more negative returns for rivals of the
announcing issuer.  During threat, larger and more widely applicable rate cuts lead to
more positive returns for rivals.  Additionally, rivals’ gains following these rate-cutting
announcement are directly proportional to the losses they sustained when the threat was
imposed.
Taken together, these results make a convincing case that regulatory threat has
affected credit card issuers, and that issuers have responded strategically to the threat.  In
the conclusion of the paper, I highlight the implications of these findings in the credit
card market and other markets, note some limitations of the analysis, and offer
suggestions for future work.
II. Theories of Regulatory Threat
Theories of regulatory threat typically analyze a firm facing a stochastic threat of
regulation. This is the approach taken by Erfle and McMillan [1990], who model firm
value as an average of regulated and unregulated profits, weighted by the probability of
regulation.
The probability of regulation may be exogenous or endogenous. While exogenous
regulatory threat reduces the value of the firm as long as its regulated value is below its
unregulated value, it does not cause the firm to adjust its price.  Endogenous regulatory
threat includes both a positive level of regulatory threat and a positive relationship
between prices and the probability of regulation.3  Under endogenous regulatory threat the
firm will constrain its price to stave off regulation.
                                                                                                                        
are examples of this line of work.
3   A deterministic threshold that induced regulation would yield a limit pricing equilibrium, in which firms
constrained prices just enough to avoid regulation.6
This simple formulation of regulatory threat contains two predictions for
empirical work.  The first is that firm values should fall when regulatory threat is
imposed; this will be true under exogenous or endogenous regulatory threat.  This
prediction, while straightforward, has not been tested in previous work.  The second
prediction, which will only be true under endogenous regulatory threat, is that firms
should cut prices to stave off regulation.4  A corollary of this prediction is that firms with
a greater exposure to or impact on the probability of regulation will cut their prices by
more than those with a lesser exposure to or impact on the probability of regulation.
These latter predictions form the basis for the work by Erfle and McMillan [1992],
Ellison and Wolfram [2000], and Maxwell et al. [1999].
Price Changes and Firm Value
In an oligopolistic environment without endogenous regulatory threat, we would expect
that price changes would directly affect profits, for firms initiating the price changes and
their rivals.  These changes in profits would no doubt vary based on the reason for the
price change, but a priori it is difficult to determine the sign of these direct profit effects.
Under endogenous regulatory threat, there will be an additional effect of any price
change – it will affect the industry-wide probability of regulation. This implies that price
changes under regulatory threat should affect firm value differently than equivalent price
changes absent regulatory threat. Furthermore, if the threat of regulation is industry-wide,
                                        
4   Glazer and McMillan [1990] note that when an increase in the probability of regulation is accompanied
by a reduction in the marginal effect of price on the probability of regulation, firms may raise prices.  Here I
assume that an increase in the probability of regulation is associated with an increase in the marginal effect
of price on the probability of regulation.  (Media accounts of the credit card market suggest that outside of
the period I identify below, there was essentially no relationship between credit card rates and the
probability of regulation).7
this difference should be apparent not only for the firm announcing the price but for its
rivals as well.
This provides two final tests of the regulatory threat hypothesis.  One such test is
that under regulatory threat, firms announcing price cuts should experience returns that
are more positive than returns absent regulatory threat.5  A second and perhaps more
important test is that in a multi-firm setting, the actions of one politically visible issuer
may spill over to all issuers in the market.  Thus under endogenous regulatory threat, the
rivals of an issuer announcing a price cut will experience returns more positive than those
absent regulatory threat.
There are two important points to make about this empirical approach. First, while
the empirical work below makes every attempt to compare the effects of  “equivalent”
price cuts made under threat and absent threat, this is difficult. Price cuts made under
threat, and indeed motivated by regulatory threat, will be different per se from price cuts
made absent threat – certainly in their motivation, and possibly in their effects on firm
value.6 This means that while rejecting equality of returns across the two regimes is
certainly evidence in favor of the regulatory threat hypothesis, we should be cautious in
interpreting the magnitudes of the observed differences in returns.
A second point is that while the empirical predictions discussed above relate to
firm value, the empirical work below uses stock market returns to infer changes in firm
value. While the regulatory threat hypothesis has fairly clear implications for changes in
                                        
5  As stated above, this does not say anything about the absolute level of returns following rate-cutting
announcements.
6  The difficulty stems (as an example) from the fact that if price changes affect the probability of
regulation, then firms’ marginal revenue and best response functions will also include the probability of8
firm value following price cuts, stock market returns following price-cutting
announcements will reflect changes in expectations about firm value. If investors fully
and rationally anticipate price-cutting following the initial imposition of regulatory threat,
subsequent price cuts might have no effect on the stock market valuation of firms. Thus,
we will only observe a link between the above pattern of changes in value and stock
market returns if investors only partially update their expectations following each
announcement or a price cut.
III. Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market
Although it has been virtually free of formal regulation since the early 1980s, the credit
card industry has faced scrutiny and criticism from Congress, academics, and consumer
groups.7  Congressional attention has waxed and waned, although certain members of
Congress have devoted consistent efforts toward correcting what they see as a “failure of
competition” in the market.8  An influential article by Ausubel [1991] identified several
features of credit card pricing that seemed to defy theories of pricing in competitive
markets.  Consumer advocacy groups also have periodically accused credit card issuers of
exploiting consumers.
These pressures have induced members of Congress to propose various forms of
regulation.  The least stringent of these are consumer protection bills such as the Credit
Card Disclosure Act of 1988; these bills typically attempt to improve the quality of
                                                                                                                        
regulation. Thus, even identical price cuts made under or absent threat will induce different responses
among the rivals of the firm cutting its price, and will lead to different ex post equilibria.
7   State-level usury ceilings existed in most states in the early 1980s, but the deregulation of interstate
banking in 1982 allowed issuers to incorporate their credit card operations in ceiling-free states such as
Delaware and South Dakota.9
information available to consumers.9  More stringent bills proposing explicit rate caps on
credit card interest rates have been introduced at various times as well.10  It seems safe to
say that until 1991, the industry viewed these bills as unlikely to pass; media and
congressional discussions of the rate cap proposals typically acknowledged that they had
little support.11
In 1991 a much stronger threat emerged.  The gap between credit card rates and
short-term market rates reached an all-time high, while rates for the largest credit card
issuers remained nearly identical to their 1982 levels.  Rep. Charles Schumer, who during
1985-1986 had opposed a rate cap while supporting the disclosure bill, reversed his
position and began advocating a cap of 800 basis points above the 6-month Treasury bill
rate.  Ausubel’s article was influential enough to gain mention in the national media,
further provoking anti-credit card sentiment.
On November 11, 1991, President Bush commented at a state dinner that he
would "like to see credit card rates down."  One business day later, the Senate voted 74-
19 to pass a bill capping credit card interest rates at 14%, well below the 19.8% rate
                                                                                                                        
8   The term is taken from Ausubel [1991].  Allegations against the industry have been wide-ranging.  Reps.
Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) have at various times accused the largest issuers of
explicit or tacit collusion.  They also mention periodically the need for consumer protection laws.
9   The support for disclosure requirements arose from the idea that imperfect price information allowed
card issuers to earn supercompetitive rents.  Shaffer [1998] finds that the passage of disclosure requirements
had no effect on pricing, which argues against the imperfect price information theory.
10   LEXIS/NEXIS’ Congressional Universe files show that there were five such bills introduced in 1986
and six introduced in 1987.  However, these bills all died in committee, most with only one sponsor.
11   In September 1986, an American Banker articled discussing a rate cap proposal had this to say: "Efforts
to put a cap on credit card interest rates suffered a serious defeat when the House Banking Committee's
consumer affairs subcommittee -- a panel that traditionally champions consumer protection -- defeated a bill
by subcommittee chairman Frank Annunzio, D-Ill., to cap rates at eight percentage points above the one-
year Treasury bill rate…Credit card rate limits are not even being considered in the Senate." -- The
American Banker, September 22, 1986.
A later article read: "Bankers concerned about moves to impose a federal ceiling on credit card
interest rates heard from members of Congress that rate caps likely will be rejected in favor of expanded
disclosure requirements." -- The American Banker, April 23, 1987.10
charged by the largest credit card issuers.  There had been little discussion of the rate cap
prior to its passage.12  Indeed, the cap was an amendment that had been attached to a
more general banking bill at the last minute.
The Bush/Senate actions sparked a furious debate in the national media and on
Capitol Hill.  The banking industry rapidly began lobbying against House passage of the
interest rate cap.  By November 19
th the efforts of the banking lobby and a White House
retraction of Bush's comments had combined to make House passage of any rate cap
unlikely.  Nonetheless, the rate cap remained a serious issue.  Many members of Congress
supported legislation that explicitly tied future congressional activity to rates, and
introduced proposals calling for studies of the market in order to determine its
competitiveness.  Most proposals set a 12- or 18-month deadline, following which the
rate cap issue would be revisited.  Initial support for these proposals was strong.
Over the next few months, the threat of regulation was mentioned periodically in
major newspapers and banking newsletters; the consensus seemed to be that it was
abating.  Congress did commission a General Accounting Office report on the
competitiveness of the credit card market, but did not explicitly tie the imposition of a
rate cap to the outcome of the study.  On April 27, 1992, an article entitled "Threat of
Credit Card Cap Legislation Easing" noted that the probability of regulation was small.
This period seems to mark the end of the threat.
IV. Regulatory Threat and Interest Rates
                                        
12   As an indication of how unexpected Bush's comments were, one can consider the following: A NEXIS
major newspaper search of "Bush and credit card" yields no matches between November 1, 1991 and
November 11.  It yields 140 matches between November 12 and the end of the month.11
In this section I present two complementary pieces of evidence regarding the influence of
regulatory threat on prices.  The first is an examination of national average interest rates
following the incidence of regulatory threat.  The second is a cross-sectional examination
of the rate-cutting of issuers with different political visibility.
Average Interest Rates Following the Imposition of Threat
Figure 1 shows the national average credit card rate and a benchmark rate, the 6-month
Treasury Bill rate, from 1972-1999.13  One notices two breaks in the series.  The first
occurs between 1980 and 1982, a period during which the average rate rose from under
18% to nearly 19%.  This increase reflects both the elimination of state-level usury
ceilings, and the effects of deregulation that allowed credit card issuers to incorporate in
usury ceiling-free states and export credit card rates across state lines.  The second break
occurs in late 1991 and early 1992, during the episode of regulatory threat.
In order to test the proposition that credit card rates fell significantly following the
episode of threat, I conduct a series of event studies using the quarterly change in the
average interest rate series as the dependent variable (for a description of the
specifications used in the event studies, and the method of calculating cumulative
abnormal returns, see Appendix A).  The results of these event studies are shown in Table
1.  The columns show results for three different estimation window specifications, while
the rows show results for various event windows.  One can see that credit card rates fell
sharply and significantly in the years following the threat.  Within one year, rates had
fallen by over fifty basis points percent, and within three years they had fallen by well12
over two hundred basis points.  These changes are particularly substantive given the
stickiness of rates prior to 1991.
Cross-Sectional Differences in Rate-Cutting Behavior
As noted by Erfle and McMillan [1990], Ellison and Wolfram [2000], and Maxwell et al.
[1999], one can use cross-sectional differences in exposure to or influence on regulatory
threat to test the hypothesis.  In the credit card market, the primary such difference is that
only the largest, most politically visible issuers would realistically affect the probability
of regulation.14  This suggests that during the episode of threat, rate-cutting would be
more pronounced for the largest issuers than for smaller issuers.
I test this prediction using a panel of year-end data for nearly 200 credit card
issuers from 1989-1994.  The issuers vary greatly in size and presumed effect on
regulatory threat.  The data are compiled from the Card Industry Directory, an annual
trade publication that lists a variety of data for the largest credit card issuers.  For each
issuer/year observation, I construct VISIBLE, a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer
is politically visible.  I define as visible the largest 20 credit card issuers in 1991.15
The episode of regulatory threat extended from November 1991 to April 1992,
and would therefore affect observations at year-end 1991, and also year-end 1992.  Under
the regulatory threat hypothesis, politically visible issuers would cut rates more than
                                                                                                                        
13   Ausubel [1991] notes that this benchmark rate tracks credit card issuers’ cost of funds fairly closely.
14   Comments by members of Congress during the episode of regulatory threat focused almost exclusively
on the largest issuers.  The sentiment seemed to be that if the largest issuers could be persuaded to cut their
rates, smaller issuers would follow.
15   The results are robust to alternate size cutoffs such as ten or fifteen.  I use a discrete measure of
visibility rather than a continuous measure (such as market share) because medium-sized issuers attract no
more attention from members of Congress than do issuers one-hundredth their size.13
smaller issuers during these two years.16  The regressions therefore specify the annual
change in each issuer’s interest rate as a function of a set of explanatory variables, which
includes VISIBLE interacted with a set of annual dummy variables.  Under the regulatory
threat hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction between VISIBLE and the 1991 and
1992 dummy variables should be negative.  The set of explanatory variables also includes
fixed year effects; dummy variables for issuer rate type and charter type; and the change
in the issuer’s default rate. 17  The dummy variables for issuer rate type and charter type
are interacted with the year effects, so that they may vary by year.18
Because the default rate may be endogenous, I consider two specifications.  The
first uses the issuer’s listed interest rate as the dependent variable:
it t i t it
it t it t it
YEAR CHARTER YEAR RATETYPE
DEFAULT YEAR VISIBLE RATE
  
  
      
       
                  
The second set of regressions uses the issuer’s default-adjusted interest rate as the
dependent variable and drops the change in default:19
it t i
t it t it t it
YEAR CHARTER
YEAR RATETYPE YEAR VISIBLE RATEDEF
 
  
   
       
                            
Table 2 shows results of these regressions.20  The 1992 coefficient on VISIBLE is
negative in every column, and significant in three of the four columns.  The coefficients
                                        
16   It is possible that smaller issuers would also cut their rates, in response to the rate cuts by larger issuers.
The movements need not be equal, however; there are persistent and significant differences in rates/margins
between larger nationally marketed and smaller regionally marketed issuers.  These differences might be
due to product differentiation conferred by product bundling at the regional level, or to consumer switching
costs.
17   Rate type is either fixed or variable, and charter type is either credit union or non-credit union.  Issuers
with variable rates and credit unions have been found to charge lower rates than issuers with fixed rates or
those who are not credit unions.  See Stango [2000] for a closer examination of these issues.
18   A set of fixed issuer effects is not statistically significant.  It is likely that first-differencing the data
eliminates any issuer-specific patterns in rate changes.14
suggest that in the time period surrounding the episode of regulatory threat, visible issuers
may have reduced their rates by more than 100 basis points relative to less visible issuers.
The 1991 and 1993 coefficients are also negative, although they generally are not
statistically significant.  Based on these results, it seems generally true that visible issuers
cut their rates by more than less visible issuers for the period 1991-1993.  One can also
note from the coefficients on the year dummies that 1991-93 was a period of falling rates
for less visible issuers.  The statistically significant rate cuts for these issuers generally
continued into 1993, suggesting that their rate-cutting lagged that of the visible issuers.
Some Remarks on the Price Evidence
While the above evidence is suggestive, before moving on it is worthwhile to discuss
some alternative explanations for the changes in pricing that occurred in the early 1990s.
First, as credit scoring technology became more sophisticated and cheaper, issuers
increasingly began to offer different rates to different consumers, and also engaged in
price discrimination by offering low introductory “teaser rates” to potential new
customers.21  While the price effects of price discrimination are typically ambiguous, it is
possible that it led in this instance to lower average rates.  It is even possible that these
changes might have been more relevant for larger issuers.22
                                                                                                                        
19   The default-adjusted interest rate subtracts annual dollars of default per $100 of outstanding balances
from the interest rate (which measures annual dollars of revenue per $100 of outstanding balances).
20 The table suppresses the coefficients on the rate and charter type variables, as they are of little interest.
21   The practice of offering different rates to different groups of consumers is not price discrimination per
se, as much of the motivation for these differences derives from differences in default risk.  However,
differences in creditworthiness, and the existence of consumer switching costs (for which “teaser rates” are
prima facie evidence) lead to incentives to engage in price discrimination based on differences in cross-
elasticities of demand.  Overall it is difficult to say how much intra-firm price dispersion is cost-based, and
how much is due to price discrimination.
22  Larger issuers are more likely to offer teaser rates than smaller issuers.  They are also more likely to
offer different rates to different customers.15
The second watershed event of the early 1990s was the entry by AT&T and other
large nonbank credit card issuers.  These issuers launched aggressive marketing
campaigns, engaged in more intense price competition than had ever been seen in the
market, and in many cases had an installed base in another market from which to draw
customers.23  The consensus in trade and media publications at the time was that these
actions were a serious threat to industry profitability.  It is certainly plausible that the
competitive pressure introduced by nonbank entry would have caused rates to fall.  It
might also explain why rates fell by more for larger issuers, because the nonbank entrants
competed more directly with that segment of the market.
In concert, these other factors certainly put downward pressure on credit card
rates. They could certainly explain a significant share of the downward movement in rates
during the episode of threat. They may also be amore plausible explanation for the
continued downward trend in rates after the threat had dissipated. Thus, while the
evidence presented above is certainly consistent with the regulatory threat hypothesis, it
would be inappropriate to ascribe the entire fall in rates to the imposition of regulatory
threat.
That having been said, there is substantial anecdotal evidence from major media
that the cuts in the six months following the announcement were responses to the threat
of regulation.  Most articles mentioned the threat directly (although issuers rarely
admitted that they were cutting rates in response to regulatory threat), and The American
                                        
23   This price competition took the form of AT&T’s “no fee for life offer” to charter members.  Both
AT&T and GM also offered rebate plans on purchases.16
Banker noted that more that 25% of issuers were prompted to seriously consider cutting
rates shortly after the episode of threat.24
In sum, the interest rate evidence is broadly consistent with the regulatory threat
hypothesis, but separating the effects of regulatory threat from these other influences
requires cleaner tests.  With this in mind, we turn to the stock market evidence.
V. Regulatory Threat, Rate-Cutting, and Returns
In this section I outline the event study approach used to measure changes in firm value.  I
then estimate the effects of the imposition of regulatory threat – the Bush statement and
Senate vote - on abnormal returns for a set of the largest credit card issuers.  Finally, I
identify the set of rate-cutting announcements both within and outside the episode of
regulatory threat, and compare the abnormal returns surrounding each set of
announcements.  The baseline is identical to that used in the cross-sectional regressions:
the twenty largest credit card issuers in the country at year-end 1991.  Due to missing
data, not all of these issuers enter the regressions below.  The Data Appendix describes
this issue in more detail.
Issuer Returns Following the Threat
In this section and those that follow, I use event studies to estimate stock market returns
for the portfolio of credit card issuers.  An event study uses stock market prices to
measure changes in firm value surrounding an event date, under the assumption that
efficient asset markets will immediately incorporate new information revealed on that
date.  Mackinlay [1997] provides a survey of event study techniques and applications.
Event studies commonly use the market model to specify the equation:
                                        
24 "Ruckus Spurring Many Banks to Weigh a Cut in Rates," The American Banker, December 6, 1991.17
      
s
it st is mt i i it D R R    
where Rit = the return on shares in issuer i at time t
Rmt = the return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio at time t
is = the abnormal return for issuer i from event s
Dst = a dummy variable equal to one during event s
it = an error term
This equation yields estimates of the abnormal return during each event period.  Here, I
use daily return data, and choose as the event date November 12,1991 – the first business
day following Bush’s comments.25  I use the window [t-270, t-21] to estimate the model,
allowing the estimation window to end twenty days before the event date to mitigate the
possibility that pre-event information changes the model parameters.26  I examine
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over two event windows: the ten-day period
preceding Bush’s comments, and the eleven-day period following them.  I estimate
separate equations for each issuer.27
One difficulty with using the market model to analyze the imposition of regulatory
threat is that during the days immediately following the Bush/Senate actions, the market
index fell substantially.  Most newspapers attributed these movements to the regulatory
threat; the movements reflected fears that an interest rate cap would lead to substantial
credit rationing, with economy-wide repercussions. Thus, the market model may be
                                        
25   Bush’s comments occurred after the close of trading on the 11
th.
26   See the discussion in Salinger [1991] regarding inference when the event may affect the model
parameters.
27   Although AT&T is in the group of issuers for which I record rate-cutting announcements, I do not
include it in the portfolio of stock prices. AT&T's holdings of credit card receivables are too small relative
to its assets to yield any discernible effect of events on its stock price.18
inappropriate because the market index was itself affected by the event.28  With this in
mind, I also use the constant mean return model:
    
s
it st is i it D R   
This specification omits the CRSP portfolio return.  It uses less information than the
market model, but as noted in Mackinlay [1997], it performs quite well in most
circumstances.
Table 3 presents summary data and the results of event studies for the events
surrounding the Bush announcement and Senate passage of the rate cap.  The top two
rows show raw cumulative returns for both the CRSP equally-weighted index and an
equally-weighted index of the credit card issuers in the sample.  There was no large pre-
event effect for either index, but both fell in the ten days following the regulatory threat.
The CRSP index fell nearly four percent, while the credit card issuer portfolio fell by over
ten percent.
The third and fourth rows use the individual abnormal returns to calculate CARs
over the ten-day periods prior to and following the regulatory threat.29 The third row uses
the market model, while the fourth uses the constant mean return model.  The
specification restricts the CARs to be identical across issuers, and allows the error terms
to be contemporaneously correlated across issuers.30
                                        
28   It is not the case here that the market index fell simply because it contains returns for the issuers in the
sample; it fell broadly, although the financial sector was hurt more severely than others.
29 As noted by Salinger [1991], there is a simple transformation of the data matrix that allows direct
estimates of CARs that correct for the forecast error implicit in their calculation.  All CARs in the paper use
this correction.
30 It is standard to allow the errors to be correlated across firms when examining the effects of a single
event on multiple firms in the same industry.  In this instance it does not make much difference whether one
allows for this correlation.19
The results here are quite similar to those in the raw data.  There is no statistically
significant CAR in the pre-event period, and a negative and significant CAR in the post-
event period.  These effects are quite large when one consider that the corporations in the
portfolio do not specialize in credit card offerings; most hold roughly 10% of their assets
in credit card receivables.  Thus, to see a net drop of ten percent in their values implies a
larger reduction in the future profit stream from credit card operations.31
The Stock Market Effects of Rate-Cutting
The next step in the analysis is the analysis of stock market effects for rate-cutting by the
largest credit card issuers.  To conduct this analysis, I identified any rate-cutting
announcements for the group of credit card issuers for the period 1986-1996, using the
LEXIS/NEXIS database of major newspapers and banking trade publications (the exact
search terms are described in the Data Appendix).32
Table A1 lists the set of rate-cutting announcements in chronological order.  There
are a total of eighteen cuts during the eleven year sample period.  Two of the cuts
occurred on the days immediately following Bush's comments, seven occurred within the
six months following the regulatory threat, and 11 occurred within one year of the threat.
This represents more than half of the total rate cuts by this set of issuers during the
eleven-year sample period.33  The rate cuts varied in size and in the percentage of an
issuer's customer base to which they applied.  It does not appear, however, that the size or
                                        
31   One should take care in interpreting these percentage figures.  Credit card operations probably
comprised much more than 10% of the discounted future profit stream for these issuers.  Thus, we should
use the 10% value as a lower bound on the change in value of issuers' credit card operations.
32   Note that these are the dates on which the cuts were announced, rather than the dates upon which they
took effect.
33 For the sample of issuers, there are two rate increases during the eleven-year sample period.  Neither
increase applied to all of the issuer's customers, and neither occurred during the episode of threat.20
applicability of the rate cuts was appreciably different following the regulatory threat.
There were simply more of them.
I use the market model to estimate cumulative abnormal returns for the periods
surrounding rate-cutting announcements.34  There are 18 announcements in the sample.
Two occurred on the two days following Bush's announcement; the effects of these
announcements can not be separately identified from the effects of the regulatory threat.
This leaves sixteen announcements.  Based on the evidence discussed in section 3, media
accounts noted the dissipation of regulatory threat by April 27, 1992.  I therefore
categorize the three announcements between November 11, 1991 and April 27, 1992 as
occurring under regulatory threat. The remainder is in the control group, during which
there was essentially no regulatory threat.35
I estimate separate equations for each issuer and announcement, and allow the
effects of the announcement to be different for the announcing issuer and its rivals.  I
impose the restriction that all rival issuer CARs are identical for a given level of threat,
and that all announcing issuer CARs are identical for a given level of threat.36  I also
report sign test results for the unrestricted estimates of issuer-event coefficients; the null
hypothesis in these tests is that fifty percent of the CARs are below zero.
Returns for Announcing Issuers
                                        
34   In some cases the estimation window contains another price-cutting announcement.  When this occurs, I
move the estimation window back in time to the closest 250-day period that does not contain a price-cutting
announcement.
35   Classifying the cuts by Banc One on April 28 as occurring under threat rather than in the control group
reduces the size and significance of the positive CARs experienced under regulatory threat in Table 4.  The
regulatory threat dummy in Table 5 remains positive and strongly significant.
36 As noted in Rose [1985] and Prager [1991], these cross-equation equality restrictions on event
coefficients will yield more efficient estimates, but might mask interesting differences across firms.21
Table 4 shows results of these event studies for three sets of event windows. The first two
event dates include either pre- and post-event dates, or only post-event dates; under the
regulatory threat hypothesis, these will reflect returns based on the announcements.37  The
last event window includes only pre-event dates, to allay any concerns that the event
studies are picking up spurious results.
The top set of rows shows results for the announcing issuers.  There is no
statistically significant effect of announcements on returns during the control period.
However, for the ten days surrounding the announcements, 73 percent of CARs for
announcing issuers are positive.  The second two columns show the results of event
studies for the announcements that occurred under regulatory threat.  The results show
positive abnormal returns for all event windows, and the CARs are statistically
significant for the shortest event window, regardless of the error structure used to
estimate the returns.  The results are fairly large in economic terms - the average
positive CAR is over ten percent for the announcing issuer.  The sign test results are
significant as well; all of the announcing issuer CARs are positive.
Returns for Rivals
The bottom set of rows shows returns for rivals of the announcing issuers – the remaining
twelve issuers in the portfolio.  Again, none of the returns during the control period are
significant, but the general pattern is for weakly negative returns – the average returns are
negative in all event windows that include post-announcement dates, and more than half
(58-59 percent) of the CARS are negative.
                                        
37   The post-event window is [t+1, t+5] rather than a more standard choice of [t, t+5] to show that nearly all
of the CARs occurred after the event date.  Compare the [t+1, t+5] CARs to the [t-5, t+5] CARs.22
The returns during the episode of threat are starkly different.  A statistically
significant majority (84%) of the returns are positive, and the average CARs are positive
and significant in nearly every specification.  The magnitude of the results shows positive
returns between four and six percent for the rivals.  These are economically significant as
well, although not as large as the CARs for the announcing issuers.
VI. Event and Issuer-Specific Influences on CARs
The results in the preceding section treat all announcements as identical, but the
announcements might differ in ways that might be empirically relevant.38  In this section I
extend the analysis by regressing the announcing and rival issuer CARs on a set of
explanatory variables.  The data are arrayed in a panel of sixteen events, with between ten
and thirteen issuer-level CARs for each event.  Due to missing data for some of the
explanatory variables, the total number of observations is 166.  I include the following
event- and issuer-specific variables in the regressions:39
(1) Magnitude of the rate cut = the size of the rate cut measured in hundreds of basis
points.  Larger rate cuts should have stronger direct profit effects (whatever their
direction), and also might have a greater effect on the probability of regulation.
(2) Affects all customers dummy = a dummy variable equal to one if the rate cut applies to
all customers of the announcing issuer.  Again, we might expect this to strengthen the
effects on returns.
                                        
38   See Table A1 for a list of the announcements and details regarding each announcement.
39   Two other variables were included in initial specifications and dropped because they were not
significant.  These are the market share of the announcing issuer, and a dummy variable indicating whether
the rate cut was accompanied by a switch to variable rate pricing.23
(3) Announcing issuer dummy = a dummy variable equal to one for the issuer announcing
the rate cut.  Given the results in Table 4, we would expect announcing issuers to
experience more positive returns than rivals.
(4) Market share = the market share of the issuer for which the observation is
constructed.  Issuers with higher market share will have greater exposure to changes
in industry profitability.
(5) Percent of assets held in credit cards = the percent of a corporation’s assets held in
credit card operations.  This also measures exposure to changes in industry
profitability.
(6) Losses from regulatory threat = the (negative) return experienced by the issuer
following the Bush remarks and Senate actions, measured as the (0, +10) CAR.40
This variable is interacted with a dummy variable equal to one during the episode of
regulatory threat.  This captures vulnerability to the regulatory threat that is not
quantifiable using the other explanatory variables.
I measure the effects of regulatory threat using two alternative specifications. The
first regresses the CARs on the set of independent variables and a dummy equal to one if
the announcement occurred under regulatory threat.  This specification effectively
assumes that the independent variables have the same effect on returns under and absent
threat, and that any benefits of reduced threat are invariant to factors such as the size of
the rate cut.  This implictly assumes that the explanatory variables above will capture the
direct profit effects of rate cuts on rivals.  We would expect that larger rate cuts, and those
that apply to all customers, would lead to more negative returns for rivals.  We would24
also expect that the two variables measuring increased exposure to changes in
profitability would be negatively correlated with returns.
While the simple dummy variable approach useful for estimating the average
difference in returns across the two regimes (threat vs. no threat), it is limited.  We might
think that the marginal effect of a given independent variable (say, the magnitude of the
rate cut) might be different under regulatory threat, particularly if the independent
variable affects the probability of regulation.  I therefore also estimate a second, more
flexible specification that interacts the regulatory threat dummy with each of the other
independent variables.  This allows the marginal effect of each variable to differ under
regulatory threat and absent regulatory threat.41
There are two dependent variables in the regressions.  The first is the raw [+1, +5]
event window CAR.  This should be viewed as estimating a lower bound on the true
change in profitability for the issuer’s credit card operations.  The second dependent
variable is a transformed CAR, equal to the raw CAR divided by the percent of assets in
credit cards for the issuer in question.42  This can be viewed as an upper bound estimate
of the change in profitability for the issuer’s credit card operations, as it assumes that the
profit stream is evenly distributed across credit card and non-credit card operations.43
                                                                                                                        
40   Essentially, Table 3 presents the averages of these issuer-specific returns.  The individual returns are all
negative, and range from –3.4 percent to –23.2 percent.
41   Ideally, we would like to interact the announcing issuer dummy with these variables as well, because the
marginal effect of the independent variables may differ for the announcing issuer.  This creates collinearity
problems that leave the model inestimable.  Excluding the observations for announcing issuers leaves the
results virtually unchanged, suggesting that their inclusion is not biasing the coefficients.
42   This transformation is similar in spirit to that in Rose [1985].  Rose implements the transformation
directly in the first stage event studies.
43   During the early 1990s, all evidence suggests that credit card operations were two to three times more
profitable than other sectors of the banking industry.25
The specifications that use the transformed CAR omit the percent of assets in credit cards
from the set of independent variables.  All specifications include fixed issuer effects.44
Table 5 shows results of these regressions.  The first two columns show results for
the specifications that omit the interaction terms.  In both columns the coefficient on the
regulatory threat dummy variable is positive and strongly significant.  Thus, both rivals
and announcing issuers experience significantly positive returns following rate-cutting
announcements under regulatory threat.45  The coefficient on the announcing issuer
dummy is positive, suggesting more positive returns on average for announcing issuers,
but it is significant only in the raw CAR specification.  For the most part, the coefficients
on the other independent variables are negative.  This is consistent with the idea that rate
cuts have negative direct profit effects; larger and more widely applicable rate cuts lead to
more negative returns, and greater exposure to changes in industry profitability is
associated with more negative returns.
The next two columns show results from the specifications that include interaction
terms.  While the regulatory threat dummy is no longer positive, the pattern of
coefficients on the interaction terms strongly supports the regulatory threat hypothesis.
Larger rates cuts, and cuts that apply to all customers lead to higher returns; both of these
effects are statistically significant.  Moreover, the coefficient on the losses from threat
interaction variable is negative, and significant at 10% in the raw CAR specification.
This suggests that issuers with larger negative returns following Bush’s remarks and the
                                        
44   Fixed event effects are not identified because some of the independent variables vary only across
events.  Estimates using random event and issuer effects yielded nearly identical results.
45   If we interpret the coefficients from the two columns as lower and upper bounds, then the average
positive return for all firms following a rate cut under threat ranges from six percent to nearly fifty percent.26
Senate actions experienced larger positive returns following rate cuts during threat.  In
concert, the positive effect of these coefficients offsets the negative coefficient on the
regulatory threat dummy.46  In addition, while there is no significantly positive effect for
announcing issuers absent threat, there is a fairly large positive and significant effect for
announcing issuers under threat.
Some Remarks on the Results
The results presented in this section yield a coherent picture.  The threat of regulation led
to negative returns for the issuers in the sample, as we would expect under either
exogenous or endogenous regulatory threat.  While there had been murmurs in Congress
and the press regarding the likelihood of price cap regulation, it seems clear that the
Bush/Senate actions were regarded as indicating a significantly higher probability of
regulation.
The regressions using the CARs as the dependent variable show that the average
return for both announcing issuers and rivals is significantly more positive under
regulatory threat.  The specifications using the interaction terms are also consistent with
the regulatory threat hypothesis.  Absent threat, larger and more widely applicable rate
cuts lead to more negative returns for rivals, and issuers that have greater exposure to
changes in profitability experience more negative returns.  The pattern is largely reversed
during the episode of regulatory threat.  In concert, the results provide support for the
regulatory threat hypothesis.
                                                                                                                        
While a positive return of fifty percent seems implausibly high, even the much weaker threat mentioned in
the conclusion below led to single-day negative returns greater than ten percent for credit card pure-plays.
46   At the means of the independent variables, these coefficients sum to 1.553, which is greater than the
negative coefficient of –1.114 on the regulatory threat dummy.27
VII. Conclusion
We do not typically think of the credit card market as one in which government
intervention has substantively changed firm behavior.  The evidence presented here
suggests otherwise.  Following the regulatory threat, prices fell significantly, and those
issuers most directly targeted cut their rates the most.  In concert with this direct price
evidence, the stock price effects of both the threat and the rate-cutting announcements
following it are strongly consistent with the regulatory threat hypothesis.  When
lawmakers linked the probability of regulation to issuer rates, rate-cutting led to
significantly more positive stock market returns for issuers announcing rate cuts.  More
importantly, the data identify strong spillover effects to other issuers following rate-
cutting announcements; this result is extremely difficult to explain without an appeal to
the regulatory threat hypothesis.
One pattern in the results that deserves further discussion. In most specifications,
the CAR regressions identify a significant positive return to being the announcing issuer.
This raises the question of why this positive “kick” exists.  It does not seem to be the case
that any issuer announcing a rate cut during this period would have experienced such a
kick; there seems to have been no race to announce first.47  This suggests that those
issuers who announced cuts first had the greatest incentives to do so.  These incentives
might have derived from cross-sectional differences in issuers’ vulnerability to regulation.
For example, issuers with high default rates would face greater incentives to ration credit
if a rate cap were imposed, and might therefore have a greater incentive to cut rates.  On
the other hand, issuers with very low default rates might also have a greater incentive to28
move first, because they would be better able to absorb the rate cut.  Unfortunately the set
of observations is too small to formally test these hypotheses.
A final point worth discussing is whether we should view this instance of
regulatory threat as a transitory event. While this is possible, it seems more likely that the
events of 1991 marked a new and permanent introduction of (or upward shift in)
endogenous regulatory threat. One reason to believe this is that the dissipation of a
transitory threat would lead to higher rates. In contrast, credit card rates remained low
well after 1991.  Further evidence in support of this idea is provided by events that
occurred over two years later. On February 21, 1993, a rumor circulated that President
Clinton was reconsidering the imposition of a rate cap.  Stocks in the credit card pure-
plays (Advanta, First USA, and MBNA) fell an average of 11% that day.  They
rebounded fully the next day after the White House denied the rumor, but this seems to
suggest that while the threat had been staved off in 1991, it might become viable at some
point in the future.48
The relevance of these events in the credit card market suggests that regulatory
threat may be an overlooked influence on pricing in other industries.  Evidence is
accumulating that similar behavior occurs in markets threatened with environmental
regulation.49  While the situations are not exactly analogous, the findings presented here
                                                                                                                        
47   Recall that of the five cuts during the period of threat, two occurred in the days immediately following
its imposition, but the remaining three were spread over the next six months.
48   Ironically, an article examining the reasons for investor jitters regarding card stocks cited the
administration’s actions toward the pharmaceutical market (the subject of Ellison and Wolfram's work) as a
reason for uncertainty.
49   Arora and Cason [1995], Maxwell et al. [1999], Hemphill [1994], Konar and Cohen [1997], and Pargal
and Wheeler [1996] all examine different aspects of this issue.  Pirrong [1995] examines similar behavior in
commodity exchanges.29
might illuminate empirical approaches to measuring the effects of regulatory threat in
these and other markets.References
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A.  Price Evidence
Average Interest Rates and Treasury Bill Rates
Average credit card and Treasury bill notes taken from the Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release E.5,
Terms of Consumer Installment Credit, and publicly available lists of Treasury bill rates.
Cross-sectional (Panel) Data
The data for the cross-sectional comparison of visible and non-visible firms are from the Card Industry
Directory, an annual trade directory.  The directory contains data for the largest 250 issuers, although
missing values limit the usability of many data points.  The values for data in the directory are measured at
year-end.
B.  Profit Evidence
The Set of Issuers in the Portfolio
The issuers chosen for initial inclusion in the sample were the top 20 (ranked by accounts) at year-end
1991, the period closest to the regulatory threat.  Due to missing data, some issuers were dropped.  The
issuers for which data exist are: Citibank, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Bank of
New York, Banc One, First Chicago, Corestates, Norwest, Manufacturers Hanover, AT&T Universal,
Wells Fargo, and Household Financial.  By 1996 only ten of these issuers remain - three having been
acquired by other issuers in the group.
Rate-Cutting Announcements
Rate-cutting announcements were compiled from the Lexis/Nexis database.  Articles from major
newspapers and industry publications were included in the search.  The first-pass search consisted of a
keyword search for "rate" and "cut" and "credit card."  Once the set of issuers had been identified, an
additional issuer-specific search was conducted, e.g., "rate" and "cut" and "Citibank."  The list in Table A1
includes all announcements found in this manner, during the period 1986-1996 inclusive.  Nearly all of the
announcements appear in The American Banker, a daily banking newspaper.
Legislation Relating to the Credit Card Market
The set of proposed credit card legislation was compiled from Lexis/Nexis' Congressional Universe data
file, which tracks proposed legislation.
Stock Prices
Daily stock returns for the major credit card issuers and the CSRP index were obtained from Wharton
Research Data Services' CRSP database.Appendix A: Event Studies of Credit Card Interest Rates
The baseline specification for these event studies is:
t t t t D X CCR           ,
where CCR is the quarterly change in the national average credit card interest rate series, X is a vector of
explanatory variables and D is a vector of dummy variables equal to one during the event window [t-4,
t+16].  The model is estimated from 1972.1 to 1995.4 (which is t+16).  The coefficients  measure
abnormal changes in the credit card series.  For each event window shown in Table 1, the cumulative
abnormal return is in theory the sum of the individual ’s for that window.  In practice, the sums and their
standard errors were calculated by using the dummy variable approach in Salinger (1992); this approach
implicitly corrects for the forecasting error implicit in the estimation of the model.
The three specifications shown in Table 1 vary the regressors in X.  The first specification includes
a only constant term (this is analogous to the constant mean return model discussed in Section 5):
t t t D CCR         1
The second specification includes the change in the 6-Month Treasury bill rate, and the lagged
change:
t t t t t D TBILL TBILL CCR                 1 2 1
The third specification allows for asymmetric responses of the credit card rates to increases and
decreases in the T-bill rate.  It also defines a dummy variable equal to one during the period of more
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Dotted vertical line marks the imposition of regulatory threat.
Credit Card Rate
6-Month Treasury Bill RateTable 1
Cumulative Abnormal Changes in Credit Card Interest Rates Following Regulatory Threat
Specification
Event Window: (1) (2) (3)
[-4, -1] -0.029 -0.033 0.165
(0.166) (0.164) (0.175)
[0, +3] -0.638** -0.652** -0.481*
(0.254) (0.253) (0.214)
[0, +7] -1.761** -1.769** -1.500**
(0.413) (0.419) (0.329)
[0, +11] -2.104** -2.103** -1.798**
(0.537) (0.549) (0.421)
[0, +15] -2.516** -2.520** -2.158**
(0.645) (0.661) (0.510)
Adj. R2 of Estimating Equation 0.72 0.74 0.81
n 95 94 94
* - significant at 5% ** - significant at 1%
Notes:
(1)  All results are calculated based on an estimating equation using quarterly data from 1972-1991.
(2)  Dependent variable in the estimating equation is the quarter-to-quarter change in the average most
common credit card interest rate, as reported by the Federal Reserve.
(3)  Event date 0 is the 4th quarter of 1991.
(4)  Specification (1) includes only a constant term in the estimating equation.
(5)  Specification (2) includes a constant term, the change in the 6-Month Treasury bill rate, and the lagged
change in the 6-Month Treasury bill rate in the estimating equation.
(6)  Specification (3) includes the current and lagged changes in the 6-Month Treasury bill rate, interactions
allowing for asymmetric effects of positive and negative T-bill rate changes, and interactions 
allowing for different (and asymmetric) effects of changes in T-bill rates from 1972-1981.
(7)  Standard errors calculated using the method in Salinger (1992) are shown below CARs.Table 2
Political Visibility and Changes in Interest Rates
Dependent Variable:  Change in
Variable Rate Default-Adjusted Rate
Visibility 0.209 0.186 0.520 0.523
(0.264) (0.287) (0.390) (0.405)
Visibility*1991 -0.567 -0.533 -0.702 -0.716
(0.480) (0.450) (0.584) (0.574)
Visibility*1992 -0.757* -0.536 -1.285** -1.007**
(0.396) (0.385) (0.494) (0.490)
Visibility*1993 -0.590 -0.108 -1.420* -1.001
(0.709) (0.656) (0.797) (0.768)
Visibility*1994 0.540 -0.122 0.865 0.024
(0.683) (0.640) (0.816) (0.750)
1991 Dummy 0.002 0.146 -0.213 -0.028
(0.154) (0.124) (0.187) (0.177)
1992 Dummy -0.274* -0.188 -0.862** -0.864**
(0.145) (0.130) (0.176) (0.171)
1993 Dummy -0.668** -0.473** -0.609** -0.392*
(0.173) (0.186) (0.200) (0.221)
1994 Dummy 0.237 -0.244 0.410* -0.033
(0.182) (0.187) (0.207) (0.221)
Change(Default) 0.097** 0.091*
(0.050) (0.049)
Constant -0.171 -0.084 -0.155 -0.109
(0.116) (0.098) (0.138) (0.130)
Effects Rate Type, Charter Type, Rate Type,  Charter Type,
Year*Rate Type,  Year*Charter Type Year*Rate Type,  Year*Charter Type
Adj. R2 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.18
n 842 842 842 842
* - significant at 5% ** - significant at 1%
Notes: (1) All standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent.
(2)  "Visible" issuers are those in the top 20 (ranked by accounts) at year-end 1991.
(3)  Data covers the period 1990-1994.  Source:  Card Industry Directory, various years.
(4)  "Charter Type" is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a credit union, zero otherwise.
(5)  "Rate Type" is a dummy equal to one if the issuer charges a variable rate, zero otherwise.Table 3
Stock Market Returns Surrounding the Threat of Regulation, 1991
Event Window:
(-10, -1) (0, +10)
Credit Card Portfolio Return 0.94% -10.61%
Cumulative Market Return 1.22% -3.89%
CAR, Market Model 0.51% -5.42%
(2.34) (2.48)
CAR, Mean Return Model 1.93% -10.49%
(2.64) (2.80)
Notes:
(1)  "Credit Card Portfolio Return" is the cumulative return on an
equally-weighted portfolio of credit card issuers.
(2)  "Cumulative Market Return" is the cumulative return on the
CRSP equally-weighted index.
(3)  CARs are calculated using the method in Salinger (1991).
(4)  Event date 0 is November 12, 1991 - the day after Bush's
statement, and one day before the Senate passage
of the rate cap.
(5)  Bold type indicates statistical significance at 5% or better.Table 4
Stock Market Returns Surrounding Rate-Cutting Announcements
Period
(1) (2) (1) (2)
CAR, Announcing Firm
(-5, +5) 0.006 0.008 0.116** 0.137**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.050) (0.050)
(+1, +5) 0.001 0.002 0.111** 0.115**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033)
(-10, -1) -0.005 0.002 -0.039 -0.029
(0.038) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)




(-5, +5) -0.01 -0.009 0.044 0.064**
(0.029) (0.020) (0.037) (0.024)
(+1, +5) -0.008 -0.005 0.041* 0.051**
(0.020) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016)
(-10, -1) 0.001 -0.002 -0.01 -0.005
(0.029) (0.019) (0.035) (0.023)
Percent Negative CAR, Rivals
(-5, +5)
(+1, +5)
* - significant at 10% ** - significant at 1%
Notes:
(1)  Column (1) allows contemporaneous correlation of errors across firms.
(2)  Column (2) assumes independent errors across firms.
(3)  Event date 0 is date the announcement appeared in the news.
(4)  CARs are cumulative abnormal returns over the event window in percent.











Cumulative Abnormal Return Regressions
Variable
CAR:
Raw Transformed Raw Transformed
Regulatory Threat Dummy 0.060** 0.499** -0.059 -1.114**
(0.008) (0.079) (0.058) (0.501)
Announcing Issuer Dummy 0.017* 0.249 0.008 0.013
(0.009) (0.162) (0.006) (0.113)
Market Share -0.117 -0.292 -0.210 -0.999*
(0.198) (0.618) (0.184) (0.594)
Percent of Issuer's Assets in Credit Cards -0.215 -0.140
(0.132) (0.142)
Magnitude of Rate Cut 0.001 -0.013 -0.002 -0.042*
(0.003) (0.023) (0.002) (0.022)
Affects all Customers Dummy -0.014** -0.193** -0.010* -0.116*
(0.006) (0.064) (0.006) (0.066)
Announcing Issuer*Regulatory 0.041** 0.662**
Threat Dummy (0.019) (0.281)
Market Share*Regulatory 0.301** 0.694
Threat Dummy (0.130) (1.083)
Percent of Assets*Regulatory -0.076
Threat Dummy (0.148)
Magnitude of Rate Cut*Regulatory 0.027** 0.375**
Threat Dummy (0.013) (0.103)
Affects All Customer Dummy*Regulatory 0.032 0.700**
Threat Dummy (0.034) (0.339)
CAR Following Threat*Regulatory -0.186* -1.996
Threat Dummy (0.095) (1.957)
n 166 166 166 166
adj. R2 0.34 0.28 0.45 0.33
* - significant at 10% ** - significant at 5%
Notes: (1)  CARs used as dependent variable are [+1, +5].
(2)  Transformed CAR = (Raw CAR)/(% of Assets in Credit Cards)
(3)  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown below coefficient estimates.Table A1
Chronology of Rate-Cutting Announcements
Applied to 
Date Announcing Firm Old Rate New Rate All Customers?
November 28, 1986 Citibank 19.8 16.8 N
December 19, 1986 Chase 19.8 17.5 N
January 19, 1987 Chemical 19.5 16.8 N
March 1, 1991 AT&T 18.9 17.9 Y
June 28, 1991 AT&T 17.9 17.4 Y
November 12, 1991 First Chicago 17.4 14.4 N
November 13, 1991 AT&T 17.4 16.4 Y
January 31, 1992 Chemical 19.8 17.8 Y
March 17, 1992 AT&T 16.4 15.4 Y
April 16, 1992 Citibank 19.8 15.8 N
April 28, 1992 Bank One various various Y
May 21, 1992 Norwest 19.8 15.5 Y
July 6, 1992 Norwest 15.5 15 Y
August 5, 1992 Chase 19.8 16.4 Y
September 17, 1992 AT&T 15.4 14.9 Y
September 17, 1992 Bank of America 19.8 16.9 N
September 19, 1996 Citibank 17.65 15.65/13.65 N
November 6, 1996 AT&T 14.9 13.9 Y
Notes:
AT&T's listed rate is that for "charter members." New member rates are 100 basis points higher.
Bank One's rate cuts were for 300-400 basis points for all customers.
Cuts within the dotted lines are denoted as occurring under regulatory threat.1
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